Revolution against Bilderberg gains momentum ! www.infowars.com WAKE Up!

Bilderberg 2011 St.Moritz Swiss : Names of attendees Agenda: Unknownn !

Friday, June 10, 2011

Thanks to the fantastic work of Bilderberg activists, journalists and the Swiss media, we have now been able to obtain the full official list of 2011 Bilderberg attendees. Routinely, some members request that their names be kept off the roster so there will be additional Bilderbergers in attendance.
Infowars will be on the scene identifying other attendees not on the list.

Belgium

Coene, Luc, Governor, National Bank of Belgium

Davignon, Etienne, Minister of State

Leysen, Thomas, Chairman, Umicore

China

Fu, Ying, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs

Huang, Yiping, Professor of Economics, China Center for Economic Research, Peking University

Denmark

Eldrup, Anders, CEO, DONG Energy

Federspiel, Ulrik, Vice President, Global Affairs, Haldor Topsøe A/S

Schütze, Peter, Member of the Executive Management, Nordea Bank AB

Germany

Ackermann, Josef, Chairman of the Management Board and the Group Executive Committee, Deutsche Bank

Enders, Thomas, CEO, Airbus SAS

Löscher, Peter, President and CEO, Siemens AG

Nass, Matthias, Chief International Correspondent, Die Zeit

Steinbrück, Peer, Member of the Bundestag; Former Minister of Finance

Finland

Apunen, Matti, Director, Finnish Business and Policy Forum EVA

Johansson, Ole, Chairman, Confederation of the Finnish Industries EK

Ollila, Jorma, Chairman, Royal Dutch Shell

Pentikäinen, Mikael, Publisher and Senior Editor-in-Chief, Helsingin Sanomat

France

Baverez, Nicolas, Partner, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP

Bazire, Nicolas, Managing Director, Groupe Arnault /LVMH

Castries, Henri de, Chairman and CEO, AXA

Lévy, Maurice, Chairman and CEO, Publicis Groupe S.A.

Montbrial, Thierry de, President, French Institute for International Relations

Roy, Olivier, Professor of Social and Political Theory, European University Institute

Great Britain

Agius, Marcus, Chairman, Barclays PLC

Flint, Douglas J., Group Chairman, HSBC Holdings

Kerr, John, Member, House of Lords; Deputy Chairman, Royal Dutch Shell

Lambert, Richard, Independent Non-Executive Director, Ernst & Young

Mandelson, Peter, Member, House of Lords; Chairman, Global Counsel

Micklethwait, John, Editor-in-Chief, The Economist

Osborne, George, Chancellor of the Exchequer

Stewart, Rory, Member of Parliament

Taylor, J. Martin, Chairman, Syngenta International AG

Greece

David, George A., Chairman, Coca-Cola H.B.C. S.A.

Hardouvelis, Gikas A., Chief Economist and Head of Research, Eurobank EFG

Papaconstantinou, George, Minister of Finance

Tsoukalis, Loukas, President, ELIAMEP Grisons


International Organizations


Almunia, Joaquín, Vice President, European Commission

Daele, Frans van, Chief of Staff to the President of the European Council

Kroes, Neelie, Vice President, European Commission; Commissioner for Digital Agenda

Lamy, Pascal, Director General, World Trade Organization

Rompuy, Herman van, President, European Council

Sheeran, Josette, Executive Director, United Nations World Food Programme

Solana Madariaga, Javier, President, ESADEgeo Center for Global Economy and Geopolitics

Trichet, Jean-Claude, President, European Central Bank

Zoellick, Robert B., President, The World Bank Group

Ireland

Gallagher, Paul, Senior Counsel; Former Attorney General

McDowell, Michael, Senior Counsel, Law Library; Former Deputy Prime Minister

Sutherland, Peter D., Chairman, Goldman Sachs International

Italy

Bernabè, Franco, CEO, Telecom Italia SpA

Elkann, John, Chairman, Fiat S.p.A.

Monti, Mario, President, Univers Commerciale Luigi Bocconi

Scaroni, Paolo, CEO, Eni S.p.A.

Tremonti, Giulio, Minister of Economy and Finance

Canada


Carney, Mark J., Governor, Bank of Canada

Clark, Edmund, President and CEO, TD Bank Financial Group

McKenna, Frank, Deputy Chair, TD Bank Financial Group

Orbinksi, James, Professor of Medicine and Political Science, University of Toronto

Prichard, J. Robert S., Chair, Torys LLP

Reisman, Heather, Chair and CEO, Indigo Books & Music Inc. Center, Brookings Institution

Netherlands


Bolland, Marc J., Chief Executive, Marks and Spencer Group plc

Chavannes, Marc E., Political Columnist, NRC Handelsblad; Professor of Journalism

Halberstadt, Victor, Professor of Economics, Leiden University; Former Honorary Secretary General of Bilderberg Meetings

H.M. the Queen of the Netherlands

Rosenthal, Uri, Minister of Foreign Affairs

Winter, Jaap W., Partner, De Brauw Blackstone Westbroek

Norway


Myklebust, Egil, Former Chairman of the Board of Directors SAS, sk Hydro ASA

H.R.H. Crown Prince Haakon of Norway

Ottersen, Ole Petter, Rector, University of Oslo

Solberg, Erna, Leader of the Conservative Party

Austria


Bronner, Oscar, CEO and Publisher, Standard Medien AG

Faymann, Werner, Federal Chancellor

Rothensteiner, Walter, Chairman of the Board, Raiffeisen Zentralbank Österreich AG

Scholten, Rudolf, Member of the Board of Executive Directors, Oesterreichische Kontrollbank AG

Portugal

Balsemão, Francisco Pinto, Chairman and CEO, IMPRESA, S.G.P.S.; Former Prime Minister

Ferreira Alves, Clara, CEO, Claref LDA; writer

Nogueira Leite, António, Member of the Board, José de Mello Investimentos, SGPS, SA

Sweden


Mordashov, Alexey A., CEO, Severstal

Schweden

Bildt, Carl, Minister of Foreign Affairs

Björling, Ewa, Minister for Trade

Wallenberg, Jacob, Chairman, Investor AB

Switzerland


Brabeck-Letmathe, Peter, Chairman, Nestlé S.A.

Groth, Hans, Senior Director, Healthcare Policy & Market Access, Oncology Business Unit, Pfizer Europe

Janom Steiner, Barbara, Head of the Department of Justice, Security and Health, Canton

Kudelski, André, Chairman and CEO, Kudelski Group SA

Leuthard, Doris, Federal Councillor

Schmid, Martin, President, Government of the Canton Grisons

Schweiger, Rolf, Ständerat

Soiron, Rolf, Chairman of the Board, Holcim Ltd., Lonza Ltd.

Vasella, Daniel L., Chairman, Novartis AG

Witmer, Jürg, Chairman, Givaudan SA and Clariant AG

Spain

Cebrián, Juan Luis, CEO, PRISA

Cospedal, María Dolores de, Secretary General, Partido Popular

León Gross, Bernardino, Secretary General of the Spanish Presidency

Nin Génova, Juan María, President and CEO, La Caixa

H.M. Queen Sofia of Spain

Turkey


Ciliv, Süreyya, CEO, Turkcell Iletisim Hizmetleri A.S.

Gülek Domac, Tayyibe, Former Minister of State

Koç, Mustafa V., Chairman, Koç Holding A.S.

Pekin, Sefika, Founding Partner, Pekin & Bayar Law Firm

USA


Alexander, Keith B., Commander, USCYBERCOM; Director, National Security Agency

Altman, Roger C., Chairman, Evercore Partners Inc.

Bezos, Jeff, Founder and CEO, Amazon.com

Collins, Timothy C., CEO, Ripplewood Holdings, LLC

Feldstein, Martin S., George F. Baker Professor of Economics, Harvard University

Hoffman, Reid, Co-founder and Executive Chairman, LinkedIn

Hughes, Chris R., Co-founder, Facebook

Jacobs, Kenneth M., Chairman & CEO, Lazard

Johnson, James A., Vice Chairman, Perseus, LLC

Jordan, Jr., Vernon E., Senior Managing Director, Lazard Frères & Co. LLC

Keane, John M., Senior Partner, SCP Partners; General, US Army, Retired

Kissinger, Henry A., Chairman, Kissinger Associates, Inc.

Kleinfeld, Klaus, Chairman and CEO, Alcoa

Kravis, Henry R., Co-Chairman and co-CEO, Kohlberg Kravis, Roberts & Co.

Kravis, Marie-Josée, Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute, Inc.

Li, Cheng, Senior Fellow and Director of Research, John L. Thornton China Center, Brookings Institution

Mundie, Craig J., Chief Research and Strategy Officer, Microsoft Corporation

Orszag, Peter R., Vice Chairman, Citigroup Global Markets, Inc.

Perle, Richard N., Resident Fellow, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research

Rockefeller, David, Former Chairman, Chase Manhattan Bank

Rose, Charlie, Executive Editor and Anchor, Charlie Rose

Rubin, Robert E., Co-Chairman, Council on Foreign Relations; Former Secretary of the Treasury

Schmidt, Eric, Executive Chairman, Google Inc.

Steinberg, James B., Deputy Secretary of State

Thiel, Peter A., President, Clarium Capital Management, LLC

Varney, Christine A., Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust

Vaupel, James W., Founding Director, Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research

Warsh, Kevin, Former Governor, Federal Reserve Board

Wolfensohn, James D., Chairman, Wolfensohn & Company, LLC

            David Rockefeller ariving at Bilderberg summit 20011

WIKILEAKS: 09ATHENS226, TURKISH EMBASSY'S VIEWS ON MIGRANT READMISSIONS

Viewing cable 09ATHENS226, TURKISH EMBASSY'S VIEWS ON MIGRANT READMISSIONS


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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin

09ATHENS226 2009-02-20 12:52 2011-06-01 08:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Athens

Appears in these articles:

http://www.tanea.gr/

VZCZCXYZ0000

OO RUEHWEB



DE RUEHTH #0226/01 0511252

ZNY CCCCC ZZH

O 201252Z FEB 09

FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3252

INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE

RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 0134

RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0683

RUEHBULAMEMBASSY KABUL 0459C O N F I D E N T I A L ATHENS 000226



SIPDIS



E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/11/2019

TAGS: PREL PBTS PHUM PTER TU GR

SUBJECT: TURKISH EMBASSY'S VIEWS ON MIGRANT READMISSIONS

FROM GREECE



REF: 08 ATHENS 1668



Classified By: DCM Deborah McCarthy for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).



Summary

-------

¶1. (C) According to an official at the Turkish Embassy in

Athens, there are two reasons why Turkey is unwilling to

permit Greece to return third-country illegal migrants to

Turkey at the port of Izmir, as called for in a 2001

bilateral protocol and which the Greeks believe would greatly

reduce the huge inflow of illegal migrants who use this

route. The first reason is concern that Turkey cannot handle

large numbers of additional illegals in a "tourist area."

Second is concern that if Greece returns the migrants to

Turkey too quickly and without adequate legal processing in

Greece, it could "violate the migrants' rights." The

official said the problem is likely to get worse, that Turkey

did not want the burden, and that Turkey might have to pull

out of the 2001 protocol if a better solution is not found.

End Summary.



Yes If by Land, No If by Sea

----------------------------

¶2. (C) We met February 9 with Turkish Embassy Second

Secretary Tolga Ucak, to follow up on readouts we had

received from Greek officials about ongoing talks with Turkey

to improve implementation of the 2001 protocol (reftel). The

Greeks had expressed frustration that, despite the protocol,

Turkey had never accepted return of more than a small number

of migrants. The Greeks' preferred solution would be to open

up Izmir -- one of three points in Turkey specified in the

protocol -- for returns by sea, which would permit thQGreek

Coast Guard to handle the returns directly without having to

go through a long and almost always unsuccessful bureaucratic

procedure via Athens to return the migrants at the land

border. According to the Greeks, their Turkish interlocutors

responded that using Izmir was impossible for unspecified

"security reasons." While this impasse has continued, the

number of migrants using the Turkey-Greece route has

skyrocketed over the past two years, with Greek authorities

detaining 146,337 illegals in 2008, most of whom had

transited Turkey. Leading countries of origin include Iraq,

Afghanistan, Somalia, and Pakistan.



¶3. (C) Ucak acknowledged that the protocol did identify Izmir

port as a point for readmitting migrants, but he said that

practical and human rights considerations made that

impossible. On the practical side, he argued that Izmir was

a "tourist area" that "could not support" a large additional

number of detained migrants. He said Turkey was in the

process of building new detention centers, but it did not

have as many resources as Greece for this purpose. These

concerns applied not only to Izmir but to any port on the

Anatolian coast that might be considered for readmissions.



¶4. (C) Ucak also expressed concern that if Greece returned

the migrants to Turkey too hastily, it might violate legal

and human rights standards. There had to be some process to

establish that the migrants had in fact entered Greece from

Turkey, although he admitted that the protocol said

circumstantial evidence could be sufficient. He also said

there had to be a procedure in Greece to consider asylum

claims by the migrants, or at least to give them a genuine

opportunity to claim asylum. Greece had come under criticism

from the EU and NGOs for its low rate of asylum request

approvals. It would simply not be acceptable, Ucak said, for

Greece to return the migrants to Turkey with little or no

consideration of the individual cases.



¶5. (C) Ucak said Turkey genuinely wanted greater cooperation

and burden sharing with Greece on migration issues, and he

pointed to a bilateral Coast Guard visit exchange program as

one example of progress. He acknowledged that the problem of

migrants transiting Turkey and Greece was getting worse, and

he expressed concern that there may be another large increase

in summer 2009. When pressed, he admitted that Turkey --

like other countries on the migration route -- did not want

the burden of being responsible for migrants who could

neither go back to their home countries nor onward to the

next destination. He added that Turkey would oppose the EU

getting involved in border enforcement in the region,

especially in the Aegean, which has long been a source of

contention between Turkey and Greece. Given the

unworkability of readmissions by sea, Ucak said, it would

probably be necessary to re-negotiate the 2001 protocol. If

this was impossible, he added, Turkey might at some point

withdraw from the protocol unilaterally.



Comment

-------

¶6. (C) In our view Turkey and Greece need to engage in more

vigorous discussions on the 2001 potocol to address the

massive flow of immigrants coming through Turkey to Greece.

The Turkish Embassy's comments about the effects on tourism

in Izmir and the need for Greece to take action on asylum

cases for people who first transit through Turkey appear to

us to be efforts to toss this hot potato. Last but not least

the comment on Turkish reaction to EU assistance to the

problem is troubling as Greece is reaching out to the EU for

assistance in handling the large flow of immigrants. We

recognize that Greece has not acted as strongly as it could

to prevent aliens from moving on to the next destination

(usually Italy) or moved as quickly as it could to enter the

aliens' fingerprints in the EU's EURODAC electronic database

to identify them as having entered Europe in Greece. We will

work with EU colleagues here to encourage the Greeks to do

so. We will also encourage them to continue efforts with the

GOT to make the 2001 protocol more workable, and would

welcome Embassy Ankara's thoughts on how to do so.

SPECKHARD

«Ναι» από τη γερμανική Βουλή στη βοήθεια Νο2

«Ναι» από τη γερμανική Βουλή στη βοήθεια Νο2


Στεφανία Παλυμετάκη

10-06-2011

Με τη συμμετοχή ιδιωτών ως, ουσιαστικά, προαπαιτούμενο όρο, ενέκρινε σήμερα η γερμανική Βουλή το σχέδιο για την παροχή νέου πακέτου οικονομικής βοήθειας προς την Ελλάδα. Το ψήφισμα είχαν καταθέσει οι κοινοβουλευτικές ομάδες των τριών κυβερνητικών κομμάτων CDU, CSU FDP.

Κατά τη συζήτηση, δεν έλειψε και η κριτική στην κυβέρνηση της καγκελαρίου Μέρκελ από τον πρόεδρο της αξιωματικής αντιπολίτευσης Φρανκ Βάλτερ Σταϊνμάιερ. Ο σοσιαλδημοκράτης πολιτικός υπογράμμισε ότι «για πρώτη φορά εδώ και δεκαετίες έχουμε μια κυβέρνηση που με θάρρος αγωνίζεται για το μέλλον ενδεχομένως και για την επιβίωση της χώρας» και απευθυνόμενος στην κυβέρνηση Μέρκελ τόνισε ότι «σύνεση και θάρρος απαιτείται και από εμάς».
Κατά τον κ. Σταϊνμάιερ, στην περίπτωση της Ελλάδας δεν πρόκειται για κρίση μόνον της χώρας, αλλά και για κρίση των ευρωπαϊκών θεσμών που πρέπει να προσαρμοσθούν για να ανταποκριθούν στις σημερινές προκλήσεις. Όπως είπε απαιτείται εναρμόνιση των φορολογικών συστημάτων, η καθιέρωση ευρωπαϊκών κατώτατων μισθών και τη θέσπιση φόρου χρηματοοικονομικών συναλλαγών.

Από την πλευρά του ο Γερμανός υπ. Οικονομικών Βόλφγκανγκ Σόιμπλε υπογράμμισε την κρισιμότητα της κατάστασης στην Ελλάδα και στην Ευρώπη. «Η κατάσταση στην Ελλάδα και την Ευρώπη είναι σοβαρή», τονίζοντας ότι πρέπει να διαμορφωθεί ένα πρόσθετο πρόγραμμα βοήθειας προκειμένου να κλείσει η τρύπα χρηματοδότησης της χώρας, έτσι ώστε να μπορέσει να καταβληθεί η επόμενη δόση στις αρχές Ιουλίου. «Χωρίς την καταβολή της επόμενης δόσης υπάρχει άμεσος κίνδυνος στάσης πληρωμών με βαρύτατες συνέπειες και παγκόσμια ρίσκα λόγω μετάδοσης της κρίσης», είπε.

Ο κ. Σόιμπλε δεν ανέφερε το εύρος που θα έχει το πρόσθετο πρόγραμμα στήριξης, ωστόσο, τόνισε ότι προϋπόθεση είναι η ανάληψη πρόσθετων προσπαθειών από την ίδια την Ελλάδα καθώς και συμμετοχή των ιδιωτών επενδυτών.
«Πρέπει να υπάρξει μια δίκαιη κατανομή του βάρους ανάμεσα στους φορολογούμενους και το χρηματοπιστωτικό τομέα» είπε ο κ. Σόιμπλε και πρόσθεσε ότι οι ιδιώτες επενδυτές δεν μπορούν απλά να μετακυλίουν τις δικές τους ζημιές στην πλάτη των φορολογουμένων.

Παράλληλα, ο Γερμανός υπουργός Οικονομικών δήλωσε ότι σέβεται τις επιφυλάξεις της ΕΚΤ για τη συμμετοχή ιδιωτών επενδυτών σε ένα δεύτερο πακέτο για την Ελλάδα.

Οι επιφυλάξεις αυτές πρέπει να ληφθούν σοβαρά υπόψη, είπε ο κ. Σόιμπλε και πρόσθεσε ότι μία κοινή επιτροπή εργασίας αναζητά ένα στενό διάδρομο ανάμεσα στην ουσιαστική συμμετοχή ιδιωτών επενδυτών και την αποτροπή των αρνητικών αντιδράσεων στις χρηματαγορές που φοβάται η ΕΚΤ.

Bilderberg 2011 member photos: help us identify the attendees!

Bilderberg 2011 member photos: help us identify the attendees!


by NewWorldOrder on June 10, 2011

As the Bilderberg 2011 conference at the Suvretta House Hotel in St. Moritz, Switzerland has finally kicked off, the first photos of arriving attendees start to come in. Here underneath you can see some pictures already with Bilderberg Group members we could recognize.

However, we want to ask everyone visiting this website to focus on the second part of the photos with “Unidentified attendees” and help us to unmask each one of these Bilderberg 2011 Attendees!

Clicking on each one of the photos gives you the full size picture.

Probably Paul Wolfowitz -President of the World Bank- arriving at Hotel Suvretta House

David Rockefeller arriving at Bilderberg 2011

Doris Leuthard – member of Swiss Federal Council

Henry R. Kravis – top financier – most likely arriving together with his wife Marie-Josée Kravis

Anders Rasmussen – Secretary General of NATO

Unidentified Bilderberg 2011 attendees:

Unidentified Bilderberg 2011 attendee 1

Unidentified Bilderberg 2011 attendee 2

Unidentified Bilderberg 2011 attendee 3



Tagged as: Anders Rasmussen, Bilderberg 2011 photos, Bilderberg attendee photos, Bilderberg attendee pictures, bilderberg group members, David Rockefeller, Doris Leuthard, Henry R. Kravis, Identified Bilderberg attendees, Identified Bilderberg members, Josée Kravis, Unidentified Bilderberg attendees, Unidentified Bilderberg members

Γ.ΠΑΠΑΝΔΡΕΟΥ : "ΑΝΙΚΑΝΟΙ ΟΙ ΕΛΛΗΝΕΣ" ΑΚΟΥΣΑ ΚΑΛΑ;

Μεταφέρουμε αυτούσιο μέρος του διαλόγου στο Πολιτικό Συμβούλιο του ΠΑΣΟΚ, μεταξύ Παπανδρέου και Παναγιωτακόπουλου, από την εφημερίδα Real.gr, όταν ο κ. Παναγιωτακόπουλος τόνισε ότι η επιτροπή από την τρόικα "αγγίζει τα όρια της εθνικής μας κυριαρχίας". "Είναι ένα είδος εθνικής υποτέλειας" όπως είπε χαρακτηριστικά:


Γ. ΠΑΠΑΝΔΡΕΟΥ: Εγώ ζήτησα τεχνογνωσία. Από την αρχή άλλωστε όταν οι τροϊκανοί ζητούσαν διάφορα πράγματα εγώ τους έλεγα ότι είμαστε ανίκανοι να τα κάνουμε. Μετά άρχισαν να το καταλαβαίνουν και αυτοί ότι είμαστε ανίκανοι.

Γ. ΠΑΝΑΓΙΩΤΑΚΟΠΟΥΛΟΣ: Έχω διαφορετική αντίληψη για τον ελληνικό λαό, δεν είναι ανίκανος ή άχρηστος.

Γ. ΠΑΠΑΝΔΡΕΟΥ: (Σε έξαλλη κατάσταση) Είμαι πρωθυπουργός και να σέβεσαι αυτά που λέω. Να ανακαλέσεις.

Γ. ΠΑΝΑΓΙΩΤΑΚΟΠΟΥΛΟΣ: Έχω διαφορετική άποψη για τον ελληνικό λαό. Και η τεχνογνωσία κατ’ ουσίαν σημαίνει πολιτική υποταγή.

WIKILEAKS : A VERY REALISTIC REPORT ON TERRORISM IN GREECE

Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin


05ATHENS2529 2005-09-27 13:53 2011-06-03 08:00 SECRET Embassy Athens

Appears in these articles:

www.tanea.gr



This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ATHENS 002529



SIPDIS



FOR P, R AND EUR/SE



E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/25/2015

TAGS: PREL KDEM KPAO EAID PHUM KMPI GR INTERNAL

SUBJECT: COMBATING EXTREMISM IN GREECE



REF: STATE 159129



Classified By: Charge Tom Countryman. Reasons 1.4(b/d).



¶1. (S) SUMMARY: In Greece, the twin threats of extremism and

violence stem more from a decades-old, homegrown anti-U.S.,

anti-NATO, anti-globalization sentiment that is deeply

engrained in Greek society than from extremism exported from

the Middle East. Domestic terrorist groups and an active

anarchist movement have long been the source of extremism and

violence in Greece. Greece's Muslim community is split

between the Turkish minority in the north (protected under

the Treaty of Lausanne), and a relatively new Athens-based

population of economic migrants from the Middle East and

South Asia. Extremist elements are rare in both. Greek

society's insular focus, with its high premium on "Greekness"

and the Orthodox religion, has created a haven for fringe

groups which target non-Greeks (especially Jews) for

violence. Above all, the United States is Public Enemy

Number One in Greece -- domestic extremist groups regularly

target the U.S. embassy to protest against both past history

and current "American hegemony." To counter extremist

attitudes, the Embassy has a multifaceted outreach program,

designed to promote mutual understanding (an MPP goal)

between the U.S. and Greece, and within Greece's increasingly

heteregeneous population. END SUMMARY.



----------------------------

FORMS OF EXTREMISM IN GREECE

----------------------------



¶2. (S) Extremism in Greece is mostly homegrown, and to a

great extent derives from events unique to Greeks. In 1968 a

military junta overthrew the Greek Goverment in a move that

is still widely (if wrongly) held here to have been at the

behest, or with the connivance, of the U.S. Government. The

Turkish invasion of northern Cyprus in 1974 is also chalked

up to American hegemonist planning. Since then, a perceived

bias in U.S. policy toward Turkey (and Greece's own identity

problems vis-a-vis 400 years of Ottoman rule) has further

skewed public opinion against the United States. In recent

history, the Kosovo air campaign and Operation Iraqi Freedom

have both been used to keep public hostility toward the U.S.

at a peak.



-- DOMESTIC TERRORISM: "17 November" (17N), a radical leftist

group, was established in 1975 and named for the student

uprising in Greece on 17 November 1973 against the ruling

military junta. It is anti-Greek establishment, anti-U.S.,

anti-Turkey, and anti-NATO, and has sought the ouster of U.S.

bases from Greece, the removal of Turkish military forces

from Cyprus, and the severing of Greece,s ties to NATO and

the European Union. For 27 years, 17N murdered Greeks and

non-Greeks alike, including five U.S. Embassy employees.

Members of the organization also committed armed robbery, and

carried out rocket attacks against symbolic targets. In 2002

a bungled attack by a 17N operative led to the arrests of

eighteen other suspects. In 2004, fifteen of these 17N

defendants were found guilty and given multiple life

sentences. Some 17N members, including individuals believed

to be involved in the murder of USG employees, remain at

large; others have never been identified. Further, other

domestic terrorist groups continue to operate in Greece, and

while they have not attained the murderous notoriety of 17N,

they serve as a beacon for the extremist segment of the Greek

population. ELA (Revolutionary Popular Struggle) has

described itself as revolutionary, leftist, anti-state,

anti-capitalism, anti-imperialism and strongly anti-U.S. ELA

emerged in the 1970s and has assumed responsibility for over

200 bombing that killed three people. In the 90s, ELA

stopped operations in Greece. Four members of ELA were

arrested in 2004. All four were convicted and each received

an imprisonment of 1,174 years. One member, Christos

Tsigarides has since been released from prison for health

reasons. In 2005 two other members were tried for ELA

actions (both were acquitted).



Recently, two groups, "Revolutionary Action" and

"Revolutionary Struggle" have appeared on the Greek domestic

terrorism radar (it is unclear as yet whether these are, in

fact, two separate groups). Some of Greece's CT elite

believe that one group ("Revolutionary Action") is a

successor to 17N. "Revolutionary Struggle" is considered to

be the successor to ELA, having simply dropped the "Popular"

from its title. "Revolutionary Struggle" has claimed

responsibility for a number of small bombings at various

Greek businesses, in which improvised explosive devices are

always the weapon of choice. These attacks take place in the

early morning hours and rarely cause injuries. There have

been a few victims inadvertently injured as a result of being

in the right place at the right time. This group usually

warns the Hellenic Police prior to detonation, however faulty

workmanship occasionally leads to premature explosions.

"Revolutionary Action" has claimed responsibility for a

number of more serious attacks directed solely at the

Hellenic Police. In the fall of 2003, two devices exploded

at a Greek Court in Athens, the second device clearly

designed to harm first responders. In May 2004 three devices

were exploded at a police precinct in Kallithea (Athens) and

again the seond/third devices seemed to be intended to cause

harm to first responders. In October 2004 a roadside device

was detonated as it was passed by a Hellenic Police bus

convoy that was in route to Korydallos Prison, the current

residence of incarcerated 17N members. There were no

injuries, likely due to poor workmanship of the device. The

most recent, and most disturbing, attack occurred on December

31, 2004, when a Special Police Guard, assigned to the

residence of the British Military Attach was assassinated

while sitting in his guard booth. Hellenic Police originally

claimed that the attack was criminal in nature, but have

subsequently attributed the attack to local terrorism. This

case, as well as the others is still open and it appears that

there are no suspects.



-- ANARCHISM: Anarchist organizations proliferate in Athens

and Thessaloniki where they have carved out niches for

themselves as extreme, leftist "irregulars." Greek

anarchists organize regular demonstrations in the name of

anti-globalization, and against the U.S. specifically and the

more ambiguous "Western influence." For the most part,

anarchist demonstrations are sparsely attended (although

well-covered in the generally anti-American media).

Gas-canister ("gazakia" in Greek) attacks have been

orchestrated to destroy property, not people. Embassy has no

evidence that anarchist groups receive material support

and/or training from international terrorist groups. Like

the domestic terror groups, however, anarchist gatherings

serve to keep alive extremist views.



-- ANTI-SEMITISM: During World War II, 90 percent of Greece's

Jewish population perished in camps. Today, only 5,000 Jews

remain in Greece, mainly in Athens. While of a smaller scale

compared to other European countries, anti-Semitism is a

recurring problem in Greece, expressed by acts of vandalism

against Jewish monuments and buildings, insidious

anti-Semitism in some media and through discrimination in the

workplace. Some Greeks subscribe to the myth that no Jews

were in the World Trade Center on September 11, or are

convinced that the attacks were a plot of the CIA, the

Mossad, or both. Greek newspapers, especially editorial

cartoonists, are unforgiving in their use of Nazi imagery to

describe Ariel Sharon and Israeli government policies in Gaza

and the West Bank. At the same time, Greece has longstanding

ties to the Palestinian cause and Arafat personally; Greece

was the last member of the EU to establish diplomatic

relations with Israel (1990). In modern colloquial Greek (as

in the modern Arab world) there is often no distinction

between "Jewish" and "Israeli." The problem is compounded by

almost universal opposition to Israeli policies in the

Occupied Territories.



¶3. (C) As an example of Greek extremist attitudes, the

Popular Orthodox Herald Party (LAOS) promotes radical

nationalism, anti-Semitism, racism and xenophobia. LAOS

party leader George Karatzaferis, who won a seat in the

European Parliament in 2004, regularly attributes negative

events to international Jewish conspiracies and has used

party-owned TV to denounce Greek politicians with Jewish

origins and to claim that Jews were behind the 9/11 terrorist

attacks. The Greek neo-Nazi group "Chryssi Avghi" (Golden

Dawn), attempted to organize "Hatefest 2005" (one of the

slogans for the event was "Turkey Out of Europe"), a

pan-European "festival" for the Far Right in southern Greece.

On a positive note, the event, after vigorous local

opposition, was moved several times and ultimately out of

Greece.



--------------------------

GREECE'S MUSLIM POPULATION

--------------------------



¶4. (C) Greece has a native Muslim minority of

Turkish-speakers, anywhere from 90,000-140,000 strong who

live in the northeastern province of Thrace and in the

islands of the far eastern Aegean near Turkey. Under the

1923 Treaty of Lausanne, this Turcophone Muslim minority has

official status; Islam is recognized and Muslims in Thrace

have the right to maintain social and charitable

organizations, to be educated in the Turkish-language and to

settle family disputes under Shari'a law (Greece is the only

country in Europe to do so). Officials say more than 300

mosques operate under Lausanne Treaty privileges. While

Muslim clerics in Thrace have been trained in Saudi Arabia,

and Turkish Consuls General in Thrace have a strong

influence, bankrolling many local leaders and the "elected"

muftis in the region, there is no indication of Muslim

extremism among the indigenous minority in Thrace.



¶5. (C) Unlike in Thrace, the Muslim community in Athens has

no treaty protection or guaranteed rights. In the last

fifteen years, migration to Greece from Muslim countries has

mushroomed -- activists believe there could be as many as

200,000 Muslim migrants (mainly illegals) in Athens, in

addition to 4,000 Turcophone Greek Muslims. There is no

official mosque in Athens, so Muslims pray in numerous

unofficial prayer rooms. There are around two dozen such

prayer rooms operating in Athens today. They are organized

in basement apartments and generally serve discrete

populations: Pakistani migrants go to a "Pakistani" mosque,

Egyptians go to an "Egyptian" mosque, and so forth. Leaders

of the Bangladeshi community have told us there is a limited

amount of crossover in their worship. Although the Greek

Parliament (finally) approved a bill in 2000 allowing

construction of a mosque in Athens, the Arbchishop of Greece

has strongly protested that the cultural center would "serve

as a breeding ground for terrorism."



---------------------------------

U.S. EFFORTS TO COUNTER EXTREMISM

---------------------------------



¶6. (C) Embassy has made good use of the IV program --

sending the only Muslim Member of Parliament on the "Young

Muslim Leaders" International Visitor Program in FY 2005. We

will send a Muslim woman from Thrace to the Young Muslim

Leaders program in FY 2006.



¶7. (C) The Embassy (POL, RSO) monitors closely hate speech

and activities through local contacts, police contacts, and

the media. We monitor Islam-related incitement and hate

speech through additional contact with muftis, imams, and

members of Muslim minority in Thrace, as well as with the

diverse and more transient immigrant Muslim population in

Athens. There are no indications or incitement or hate

speech directed against Muslims occurring in Athens.



¶8. (U) The Embassy has undertaken a series of outreach

activities oriented at the Muslim population in Greece. We

opened an American Corner in Xanthi, a town in northeast

Greece that is predominantly Muslim, and the IRC regularly

sends material to Xanthi as part of the Embassy's

country-wide outreach program. Ambassador hosts a yearly

Iftar dinner. Ambassador and Embassy officers have spoken to

student groups on U.S. policy in the Middle East, including

students from Arab and non-Arab Muslim countries. Embassy

and ConGen officers meet regularly with Muslim religious and

community leaders in Thrace and Athens. Cultural program

opportunities will be utilized in 2006.



¶9. (U) As noted, the Embassy sent Ilhan Ahmet, the one

Muslim Member of the Greek Parliament, on an IV program this

year. His website, www.ilhanahmet.com, is in Turkish and

Greek. (NOTE: Greek usage of the world wide web is the

lowest in the EU. END NOTE.) Building on Ahmet's IV program,

we have helped develop a farming seminar to meet the needs of

Muslim farmers in northern Greece.



----------------------------------

GREEK EFFORTS TO COUNTER EXTREMISM

----------------------------------



¶10. (S) The Greek Government's track record in countering

extremism is uneven. 17N operated with impunity for 27

years, counting Greek police and government officials among

its victims. The Olympic Games provided a much-needed

incentive to bring Greek methods and operations into the 21st

century. As a result, Greece now has more tools and know-how

to keep track of extremist groups in Greek society. These

skills, however, are perishable and require routine follow-up

training. We do not believe such training has continued

since the Olympics. Furthermore, we are skeptical as to

whether or not the Hellenic Police are pursuing Islamic

extremists in Greece with that same "pre-Olympic" vigor.

Greek society also views enhanced police capabilities with a

jaundiced eye. Greeks are hypersensitive to any perceived

limits on personal freedoms; as an example, security cameras

around town have been vandalized. Members of Parliament have

also inveighed against their use; attempts to pass off the

cameras as trafficams have been only partly successful.



¶11. (C) Recently, the GoG appears to have taken a greater

interest in moving against self-styled "anti-imperialist"

anarchists who operate mainly in central Athens. In an

August meeting, Public Order Minister Voulgarakis,

responsible for police, promised to crack down on violent

anarchist activity, telling the Ambassador that the July

arrest of three anarchists had produced evidence that would

result in convictions and more arrests in the future.

Thessaloniki police have estimated there are 50-70 local

anarchists who regularly incite violence. Recently, the

Ministry of Public Order has called the Greek judiciary to

task for a lack of prosecutions of the hundreds of anarchists

arrested during the many destructive and violent

demonstrations held in both Athens and Thessaloniki.

¶12. (C) The Government attempted to ignore "Hatefest 2005"

until the outcry from Greek citizens became too loud. At

that point, Greek Government Spokesman Roussopoulos stated

that the GoG would take all measures to prevent the

"Hatefest" gathering. Public Order Minister Voulgarakis

seconded Roussopoulos' comments, saying the event was not

welcome.



¶13. (C) The Government has taken steps to combat

anti-Semitism, and has begun to press for membership on the

International Task Force on Holocaust Education. However, it

was in part the result of heavy Embassy pressure that Greece

established January 27 as Holocaust Remembrance Day in 2004.

The Central Board of Jewish Communities in Greece constantly

lobbies for moderation, tolerance, and freedom. The Greek

Jewish community says the greatest problem faced by local

Jews is the widespread perception that they are not truly

"Greek." The Greek constitution enshrines Greek Orthodoxy as

the official religion and the country's non-Orthodox

minorities - Jews, Turcophone Muslims, Catholics, and other

Christians - report difficulty advancing in careers in the

military, education, and the public sector. It's not

accurate to paint the Orthodox Church as anti-Semitic, but it

is so virulently pro-Orthodox that the distinction is often

lost.



¶14. (C) As is the norm in the EU, Greece has a modern

education system that accepts pluralism and open intellectual

exchange. Universities do, however, serve as recruiting

centers (and worse) for anarchists. As a result of the 1973

student uprising against the military junta ruling Greece,

Greece passed a law prohibiting police on university

campuses. As recently as May 2005, anarchists took hostages

at the Athens Polytechnic University and held them for more

than eight hours as a protest against the presence on campus

of armed bodyguards who had accompanied two Members of

Parliament to the university for a book presentation (the 2

MPs, both former Cabinet Ministers, were among the hostages).

Prior to the actual standoff, anarchists detected that

police assigned to protect 2 MPs attending the event) were on

campus in violation of government regulations. The

anarchists proceeded to attack the police and one policeman

shot an attacker in the leg, in an effort to protect himself.

The standoff ended peacefully, but the university academic

board published a condemnation of the "police action" and

called on Greeks to protest against the government. There

was very little negative press that condemned the violence of

the anarchists.



¶15. (U) As part of Greece's effort to join the International

Task Force on Holocaust Education, the Greek Ministry of

Education and Religious Affairs has requested Post's

assistance in re-designing its curricula to update teaching

of the Holocaust.



¶16. (U) Public (State) education is readily accessible,

particularly for women and girls. Minority education is

fully funded by the State, which funds madrassas where there

are significant Muslim communities. In recent years, these

madrassas have been opened to girls (who are required to wear

headscarves).

COUNTRYMAN

WIKILEAKS : FOREIGN MINISTER BAKOYIANNIS' VISIT TO WASHINGTON

Viewing cable 09ATHENS235, FOREIGN MINISTER BAKOYIANNIS' VISIT TO WASHINGTON


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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin

09ATHENS235 2009-02-23 05:52 2011-05-26 08:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Athens

Appears in these articles:

www.tanea.gr



VZCZCXYZ0000

PP RUEHWEB



DE RUEHTH #0235/01 0540552

ZNY CCCCC ZZH

P 230552Z FEB 09

FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3262

INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

RUEHSQ/AMEMBASSY SKOPJE PRIORITY 1206C O N F I D E N T I A L ATHENS 000235



SIPDIS



E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/19/2019

TAGS: PREL PGOV GR MK

SUBJECT: FOREIGN MINISTER BAKOYIANNIS' VISIT TO WASHINGTON



Classified By: AMBASSADOR DAN SPECKHARD. REASON: 1.4 (B) AND (D).



¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Greek FM Dora Bakoyiannis will use her

visit to Washington to define, publicly and privately,

Greece's relations with the Obama administration. A

charismatic yet practical politician, Bakoyiannis relishes

her job as Foreign Minister, and will offer to work with us

on a broad range of multilateral issues. As OSCE

Chairman-in-Office, she has moved swiftly out of the gate,

pressing creative proposals to maintain an OSCE presence in

Georgia and achieving a technical rollover of OSCE's Georgia

Military Monitors that keeps them on the ground through June.

She will offer to use her contacts with leaders in the

Middle East to assist our efforts in the region. And she

will cite Greece's ratification this week of NATO accession

protocols for Croatia and Albania as a sign of their

commitment to the Alliance and its expansion. She will also

use the opportunity to press for swift action on their most

wanted deliverable: inclusion in the Visa Waiver Program.

We also see this as an opportunity to reinvigorate and

reorient our bilateral relationship. That means urging

additional Greek contributions to NATO operations in

Afghanistan, encouraging energy diversity, and urging Greece

to resolve its disagreements with Turkey quietly and

bilaterally. Finally, we should urge the GOG to continue to

work within the UN process to resolve its dispute with the

Republic of Macedonia. END SUMMARY.



NEW ADMINISTRATION, NEW MOMENTUM



¶2. (C) PM Karamanlis' recent cabinet reshuffle left Dora

Bakoyiannis at the helm of the MFA, a job she has held for

nearly three years. The daughter of former PM Mitsotakis,

she is his strongest potential rival for the New Democracy

party's leadership (she consistently polls as Greece's most

popular politician), yet (despite near-endless press

speculation) she and Karamanlis have worked together

cooperatively. They need to. Karamanlis' government was

re-elected with two-seat Parliamentary majority in September

2007 that has since shrunk to a one-seat majority. The

government has taken additional body blows since then:

alleged involvement in various scandals, sinking economic

growth, and criticism over its handling of December's police

shooting of an Athens teenager and the extensive rioting that

followed. The rioting has been followed by a resurgence of

domestic terrorism, which Dora takes personally; her first

husband was killed by the terrorist group November 17.



¶3. (C) New Democracy has fallen 3-4 points behind its main

opposition, socialist PASOK, in opinion polls (though PM

Karamanlis personally outpolls opposition PM-in-waiting

George Papandreou by about the same margin). Looking for

electoral advantage, Bakoyiannis will spin her visit to

Washington as signaling a new era of cooperation, both on

bilateral and multilateral issues. Greeks have

overwhelmingly welcomed the Obama administration; Bakoyiannis

will be looking for "takeaways" that demonstrate our ability

to work with the Karamanlis government. However, that will

require some hard work from Greece as well.



VISA WAIVER: GREECE'S BILATERAL GOAL



¶4. (C) For Greece, inclusion in the Visa Waiver Program

tops, by far, every other issue in our bilateral

relationship. Yet their own footdragging means they have

missed the boat not once, but twice; they are the only member

of the original EU 15 not to participate. Two out of three

key pieces (the HSPD-6 Agreement and VWP MOU) are either in

place or nearly complete. The third, the agreement on

Preventing and Combating Serious Crime (PCSC) was under

review in the Ministries of Justice and Interior since

October. We finally received Greek comments on February 20.

The Secretary can assure Dora that we will examine it

rapidly, and intend to work together to meet DHS requirements

as rapidly as possible.





PROMOTING MULTILATERAL COOPERATION: IN NATO AND AFGHANISTAN

. . .



¶5. (C) Greece has contributed 638 troops to NATO operations

in Kosovo, 140 to NATO operations in Afghanistan. 50 to

NATO's counter-terrorism operation in the Mediterranean and

45 to the EU's military mission in Bosnia. Greece also

contributes directly to U.S. military operations in the

Middle East and Mediterranean through the U.S. base at Souda

Bay, Crete. But we are pressing our most NATO-skeptic ally

for more, particularly in Afghanistan -- including additional

trainers, heavy lift helicopters, and funds to sustain an

enhanced Afghan National Army. We have also asked them to

lift a self-imposed caveat restricting Greek forces to the

Kabul region, and have informal indications that may be in

the works. On February 17, the Greek Parliament ratified

Albania and Croatia's accession protocols; the Secretary will

want to congratulate Bakoyiannis on this important step.



. . . IN OSCE . . .



¶6. (C) Greece took on the chairmanship of the OSCE in

January, and has moved quickly and effectively out of the

gate. FM Bakoyiannis has already travelled to Vienna,

Albania, Kosovo, Serbia, Georgia, and Russia in her capacity

as OSCE Chairman-in-Office. Under her direction, Greek

diplomats have crafted proposals (still under review) to

maintain a long-term OSCE presence in Georgia, and have

achieved a technical rollover of the OSCE Military Monitors

in Georgia through June 30, 2009. The Secretary can commend

Bakoyiannis' commitment to the OSCE, her work so far, and

suggest we cooperate closely throughout the year. The

Secretary may also want to highlight our interest in the

OSCE's human rights work, including with Roma communities and

against human trafficking. Bakoyiannis is keenly interested

in hearing the U.S. take on Russian suggestions related to

European security.



. . . IN THE AEGEAN . . .



¶7. (C) Greece sees an uptick in "provocations" by Turkey in

the Aegean, including overflights. Bakoyiannis will

underscore the Karamanlis government's commitment to good

relations with Turkey (Karamanlis' visit to Ankara last year

is the first in fifty years), but will express concern that

the Turkish "deep state" has impeded PM Erdogan's ability to

deliver on better Turkish-Greek relations. Bakoyiannis will

likely to seek the Secretary's help with Turkey in reducing

these "provocations." We have encouraged the GOG to respond

in a low-key manner and with restraint to any perceived

"provocations" and to raise concerns directly with Turkish

counterparts.



. . . . IN THE BALKANS . . .



¶8. (C) Greece sees the Balkans as its backyard, and is a

major investor in the region. That is one reason why Greece

has put forward the candidacy of their Ambassador to the

United States, Ambassador Mallias, for EUSR (also High

Representive) in Bosnia. We have told them that we prefer

the UK candidate (Sir Emyr Jones Parry). Nevertheless, we

expect Bakoyiannis may make at least a pro forma pitch for

him. Greece has not yet recognized Kosovo but during her

February visit to Kosovo, Bakoyiannis publicly emphasized

that she had come as a "neighbor, and friend," as well as

OSCE CIO. Greece is also contributing personnel to the

International Civilian Office and its strongest NATO troop

contribution is to KFOR. Greece also continues to take a

constructive role in promoting a European orientation for

Serbia.



¶9. (C) A key issue, for both Greece and for us, is

Macedonia. Greece continues to believe that our recognition

of the Republic of Macedonia by its constitutional name in

2004 was a betrayal of our bilateral relationship. The

Karamanlis government feels it took a major step forward when

it agreed that a composite name could include the word

Macedonia -- and are aggrieved by the Gruevski government's

actions (such as a recent renaming of a planned highway built

with EU, including Greek, funds after Alexander the Great).

Greece's refusal to approve Macedonia's NATO invitation in

2008 despite the provisions of the Greek/Macedonia Interim

Accord was a major source of disagreement. UN led

negotiations continue. Bakoyiannis will likely urge us to

press the GoM for flexibility.



. . . IN THE MIDDLE EAST . . .



¶10. (C) Bakoyiannis is interested in Middle East issues,

and has developed contacts with a number of leaders in the

region. She may offer her good offices to assist in

promoting dialogue there. Greece has an Embassy in Iran, and

Bakoyiannis may also offer to facilitate dialogue there. She

has been a strong promoter of dialogue among women leaders,

and will likely invite the Secretary to participate in a

conference to be held in Athens in April on Women Against

Terrorism (held uner the auspices of the Women Leaders'

Working Group).



. . . ON CYPRUS . . .



¶11. (C) Bakoyiannis recently discussed Cyprus with Codel

Durbin, and will support efforts by the leaders of both

communities to find a settlement. She shares the Karamanlis

government's commitment to EU entry for Turkey, and knows

that a resolution of the Cyprus issue is essential for

Turkey's candidacy to move forward. Yet Greek support for

Cyprus' own position in EU fora is expected, both in Athens

and in Nicosia. In addition, Bakoyiannis will reiterate that

Turkey must meet all EU criteria, and cannot choose among

them "a la carte."



. . . ON ENERGY DIVERSITY . . .



¶12. (C) We should encourage Greece to promote energy

diversity, including within the EU. Currently, Gazprom

suplies approximately 90 percent of Greece's pipeline-sourced

natural gas supplies. Alternatives include the

Turkey-Greece-Italy (TGI) pipeline that will receive Caspian

gas, as well as increased reliance on LGN and

interconnections between European energy infrastructure.





. . . AND THE ECONOMY



¶13. (SBU) The global economic crisis is beginning to have

an impact on Greece's real economy. Growth slowed to 3.0

percent in 2008, and the government projects it will slow

even further in 2009 to 1.1 percent. While it is only one of

a handful of Eurozone countries projected to have any growth

in 2009, the slowdown is exposing some weaknesses in the

Greek economy; large current account (14.5 percent of GDP in

2008) and fiscal deficits (3.7 percent of GDP in 2008) and a

high level of public debt (94.6 percent of GDP in 2008)

constrain the GOG's flexibility to develop expenditure

programs that can mitigate the slowdwn.







SPECKHARD

O ΛΑΟΣ ΕΧΕΙ ΔΙΚΑΙΩΜΑ ΝΑ ΑΝΑΤΡΕΨΕΙ ΜΕ ΚΑΘΕ ΜΕΣΟ ΑΥΤΗ ΤΗΝ ΚΥΒΕΡΝΗΣΗ!

Το άρθρο 1 του Συντάγματος λέγει σαφώς:
"Όλες οι εξουσίες πηγάζουν από το λαό, υπάρχουν υπέρ αυτού και ασκούνται όπως το Σύνταγμα ορίζει".
Συνεπώς η εξουσία βρίσκεται έξω από την Βουλή. Όσοι είναι μέσα στην Βουλή δεν αποτελούν εξουσία αλλά έχουν ορισθεί από τον λαό να τηρούν το Σύνταγμα και να εφαρμόζουν τους νόμους για λογαριασμό του λαού.
Εφόσον παραβιάζουν το Σύνταγμα, ο λαός έχει δικαίωμα και υποχρέωση να τους ξηλώσει από την καρέκλα και να αποκαταστήσει τη νομιμότητα.
Αυτό άλλωστε προβλέπει το ίδιο το Σύνταγμα στο Άρθρο 120 §4: "Η τήρηση του παρόντος (του Συντάγματος) επαφίεται στον πατριωτισμό των Ελλήνων, που δικαιούνται και υποχρεούνται να αντιστέκονται με κάθε μέσον εναντίον οποιουδήποτε επιχειρεί να το καταλύσει με τη βία".
Ο λαός συνεπώς καλύπτεται νομικά από κάθε άποψη: Και στο να διαδηλώνει και να διαμαρτύρεται με συγκεντρώσεις στις πλατείες της χώρας αλλά -κυρίως- δικαιούται και υποχρεούται να αντιστέκεται με κάθε μέσον εναντίον όποιου επιχειρεί να καταλύσει το Σύνταγμα!
Όταν δε, οι εκλεγμένοι από το λαό βουλευτές, έχουν ήδη παραβιάσει το Σύνταγμα υπογράφοντας παράνομη δανειακή σύμβαση με την τρόϊκα, στην οποία σήμερα εκχωρούν την δημόσια περιουσία, χωρίς την έγκριση ή εξουσιοδότηση του λαού, τότε ο λαός δικαιούται ή υποχρεούται να ανατρέψει την κυβέρνηση. Κατ' αυτό τον τρόπο προστατεύει την εθνική κυριαρχία της χώρας.
Ο Ηράκλειτος ο οποίος πρέσβευε ότι πρέπει να υπάρχει απόλυτος σεβασμός στους νόμους, πριν από 2500 χρόνια είχε πει: "Μάχεσθαι χρη τον δήμον υπέρ του νόμου, όκωσπερ τείχεος", δηλαδή ο λαός πρέπει να μάχεται υπέρ του νόμου, όπως όταν υπερασπίζεται τα τείχη της πόλης κατά την προσβολή από τους εχθρούς.

Η ΚΛΟΠΗ ΤΩΝ ΓΛΥΠΤΩΝ ΤΟΥ ΝΑΟΥ ΤΗΣ ΑΦΑΙΑΣ