Παρασκευή 10 Ιουνίου 2011

WIKILEAKS: 09ATHENS226, TURKISH EMBASSY'S VIEWS ON MIGRANT READMISSIONS

Viewing cable 09ATHENS226, TURKISH EMBASSY'S VIEWS ON MIGRANT READMISSIONS


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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin

09ATHENS226 2009-02-20 12:52 2011-06-01 08:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Athens

Appears in these articles:

http://www.tanea.gr/

VZCZCXYZ0000

OO RUEHWEB



DE RUEHTH #0226/01 0511252

ZNY CCCCC ZZH

O 201252Z FEB 09

FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3252

INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE

RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 0134

RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0683

RUEHBULAMEMBASSY KABUL 0459C O N F I D E N T I A L ATHENS 000226



SIPDIS



E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/11/2019

TAGS: PREL PBTS PHUM PTER TU GR

SUBJECT: TURKISH EMBASSY'S VIEWS ON MIGRANT READMISSIONS

FROM GREECE



REF: 08 ATHENS 1668



Classified By: DCM Deborah McCarthy for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).



Summary

-------

¶1. (C) According to an official at the Turkish Embassy in

Athens, there are two reasons why Turkey is unwilling to

permit Greece to return third-country illegal migrants to

Turkey at the port of Izmir, as called for in a 2001

bilateral protocol and which the Greeks believe would greatly

reduce the huge inflow of illegal migrants who use this

route. The first reason is concern that Turkey cannot handle

large numbers of additional illegals in a "tourist area."

Second is concern that if Greece returns the migrants to

Turkey too quickly and without adequate legal processing in

Greece, it could "violate the migrants' rights." The

official said the problem is likely to get worse, that Turkey

did not want the burden, and that Turkey might have to pull

out of the 2001 protocol if a better solution is not found.

End Summary.



Yes If by Land, No If by Sea

----------------------------

¶2. (C) We met February 9 with Turkish Embassy Second

Secretary Tolga Ucak, to follow up on readouts we had

received from Greek officials about ongoing talks with Turkey

to improve implementation of the 2001 protocol (reftel). The

Greeks had expressed frustration that, despite the protocol,

Turkey had never accepted return of more than a small number

of migrants. The Greeks' preferred solution would be to open

up Izmir -- one of three points in Turkey specified in the

protocol -- for returns by sea, which would permit thQGreek

Coast Guard to handle the returns directly without having to

go through a long and almost always unsuccessful bureaucratic

procedure via Athens to return the migrants at the land

border. According to the Greeks, their Turkish interlocutors

responded that using Izmir was impossible for unspecified

"security reasons." While this impasse has continued, the

number of migrants using the Turkey-Greece route has

skyrocketed over the past two years, with Greek authorities

detaining 146,337 illegals in 2008, most of whom had

transited Turkey. Leading countries of origin include Iraq,

Afghanistan, Somalia, and Pakistan.



¶3. (C) Ucak acknowledged that the protocol did identify Izmir

port as a point for readmitting migrants, but he said that

practical and human rights considerations made that

impossible. On the practical side, he argued that Izmir was

a "tourist area" that "could not support" a large additional

number of detained migrants. He said Turkey was in the

process of building new detention centers, but it did not

have as many resources as Greece for this purpose. These

concerns applied not only to Izmir but to any port on the

Anatolian coast that might be considered for readmissions.



¶4. (C) Ucak also expressed concern that if Greece returned

the migrants to Turkey too hastily, it might violate legal

and human rights standards. There had to be some process to

establish that the migrants had in fact entered Greece from

Turkey, although he admitted that the protocol said

circumstantial evidence could be sufficient. He also said

there had to be a procedure in Greece to consider asylum

claims by the migrants, or at least to give them a genuine

opportunity to claim asylum. Greece had come under criticism

from the EU and NGOs for its low rate of asylum request

approvals. It would simply not be acceptable, Ucak said, for

Greece to return the migrants to Turkey with little or no

consideration of the individual cases.



¶5. (C) Ucak said Turkey genuinely wanted greater cooperation

and burden sharing with Greece on migration issues, and he

pointed to a bilateral Coast Guard visit exchange program as

one example of progress. He acknowledged that the problem of

migrants transiting Turkey and Greece was getting worse, and

he expressed concern that there may be another large increase

in summer 2009. When pressed, he admitted that Turkey --

like other countries on the migration route -- did not want

the burden of being responsible for migrants who could

neither go back to their home countries nor onward to the

next destination. He added that Turkey would oppose the EU

getting involved in border enforcement in the region,

especially in the Aegean, which has long been a source of

contention between Turkey and Greece. Given the

unworkability of readmissions by sea, Ucak said, it would

probably be necessary to re-negotiate the 2001 protocol. If

this was impossible, he added, Turkey might at some point

withdraw from the protocol unilaterally.



Comment

-------

¶6. (C) In our view Turkey and Greece need to engage in more

vigorous discussions on the 2001 potocol to address the

massive flow of immigrants coming through Turkey to Greece.

The Turkish Embassy's comments about the effects on tourism

in Izmir and the need for Greece to take action on asylum

cases for people who first transit through Turkey appear to

us to be efforts to toss this hot potato. Last but not least

the comment on Turkish reaction to EU assistance to the

problem is troubling as Greece is reaching out to the EU for

assistance in handling the large flow of immigrants. We

recognize that Greece has not acted as strongly as it could

to prevent aliens from moving on to the next destination

(usually Italy) or moved as quickly as it could to enter the

aliens' fingerprints in the EU's EURODAC electronic database

to identify them as having entered Europe in Greece. We will

work with EU colleagues here to encourage the Greeks to do

so. We will also encourage them to continue efforts with the

GOT to make the 2001 protocol more workable, and would

welcome Embassy Ankara's thoughts on how to do so.

SPECKHARD

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