Viewing cable 09ATHENS226, TURKISH EMBASSY'S VIEWS ON MIGRANT READMISSIONS
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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ATHENS226 2009-02-20 12:52 2011-06-01 08:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Athens
Appears in these articles:
http://www.tanea.gr/
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHTH #0226/01 0511252
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 201252Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3252
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 0134
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0683
RUEHBULAMEMBASSY KABUL 0459C O N F I D E N T I A L ATHENS 000226
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/11/2019
TAGS: PREL PBTS PHUM PTER TU GR
SUBJECT: TURKISH EMBASSY'S VIEWS ON MIGRANT READMISSIONS
FROM GREECE
REF: 08 ATHENS 1668
Classified By: DCM Deborah McCarthy for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).
Summary
-------
¶1. (C) According to an official at the Turkish Embassy in
Athens, there are two reasons why Turkey is unwilling to
permit Greece to return third-country illegal migrants to
Turkey at the port of Izmir, as called for in a 2001
bilateral protocol and which the Greeks believe would greatly
reduce the huge inflow of illegal migrants who use this
route. The first reason is concern that Turkey cannot handle
large numbers of additional illegals in a "tourist area."
Second is concern that if Greece returns the migrants to
Turkey too quickly and without adequate legal processing in
Greece, it could "violate the migrants' rights." The
official said the problem is likely to get worse, that Turkey
did not want the burden, and that Turkey might have to pull
out of the 2001 protocol if a better solution is not found.
End Summary.
Yes If by Land, No If by Sea
----------------------------
¶2. (C) We met February 9 with Turkish Embassy Second
Secretary Tolga Ucak, to follow up on readouts we had
received from Greek officials about ongoing talks with Turkey
to improve implementation of the 2001 protocol (reftel). The
Greeks had expressed frustration that, despite the protocol,
Turkey had never accepted return of more than a small number
of migrants. The Greeks' preferred solution would be to open
up Izmir -- one of three points in Turkey specified in the
protocol -- for returns by sea, which would permit thQGreek
Coast Guard to handle the returns directly without having to
go through a long and almost always unsuccessful bureaucratic
procedure via Athens to return the migrants at the land
border. According to the Greeks, their Turkish interlocutors
responded that using Izmir was impossible for unspecified
"security reasons." While this impasse has continued, the
number of migrants using the Turkey-Greece route has
skyrocketed over the past two years, with Greek authorities
detaining 146,337 illegals in 2008, most of whom had
transited Turkey. Leading countries of origin include Iraq,
Afghanistan, Somalia, and Pakistan.
¶3. (C) Ucak acknowledged that the protocol did identify Izmir
port as a point for readmitting migrants, but he said that
practical and human rights considerations made that
impossible. On the practical side, he argued that Izmir was
a "tourist area" that "could not support" a large additional
number of detained migrants. He said Turkey was in the
process of building new detention centers, but it did not
have as many resources as Greece for this purpose. These
concerns applied not only to Izmir but to any port on the
Anatolian coast that might be considered for readmissions.
¶4. (C) Ucak also expressed concern that if Greece returned
the migrants to Turkey too hastily, it might violate legal
and human rights standards. There had to be some process to
establish that the migrants had in fact entered Greece from
Turkey, although he admitted that the protocol said
circumstantial evidence could be sufficient. He also said
there had to be a procedure in Greece to consider asylum
claims by the migrants, or at least to give them a genuine
opportunity to claim asylum. Greece had come under criticism
from the EU and NGOs for its low rate of asylum request
approvals. It would simply not be acceptable, Ucak said, for
Greece to return the migrants to Turkey with little or no
consideration of the individual cases.
¶5. (C) Ucak said Turkey genuinely wanted greater cooperation
and burden sharing with Greece on migration issues, and he
pointed to a bilateral Coast Guard visit exchange program as
one example of progress. He acknowledged that the problem of
migrants transiting Turkey and Greece was getting worse, and
he expressed concern that there may be another large increase
in summer 2009. When pressed, he admitted that Turkey --
like other countries on the migration route -- did not want
the burden of being responsible for migrants who could
neither go back to their home countries nor onward to the
next destination. He added that Turkey would oppose the EU
getting involved in border enforcement in the region,
especially in the Aegean, which has long been a source of
contention between Turkey and Greece. Given the
unworkability of readmissions by sea, Ucak said, it would
probably be necessary to re-negotiate the 2001 protocol. If
this was impossible, he added, Turkey might at some point
withdraw from the protocol unilaterally.
Comment
-------
¶6. (C) In our view Turkey and Greece need to engage in more
vigorous discussions on the 2001 potocol to address the
massive flow of immigrants coming through Turkey to Greece.
The Turkish Embassy's comments about the effects on tourism
in Izmir and the need for Greece to take action on asylum
cases for people who first transit through Turkey appear to
us to be efforts to toss this hot potato. Last but not least
the comment on Turkish reaction to EU assistance to the
problem is troubling as Greece is reaching out to the EU for
assistance in handling the large flow of immigrants. We
recognize that Greece has not acted as strongly as it could
to prevent aliens from moving on to the next destination
(usually Italy) or moved as quickly as it could to enter the
aliens' fingerprints in the EU's EURODAC electronic database
to identify them as having entered Europe in Greece. We will
work with EU colleagues here to encourage the Greeks to do
so. We will also encourage them to continue efforts with the
GOT to make the 2001 protocol more workable, and would
welcome Embassy Ankara's thoughts on how to do so.
SPECKHARD
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