WIKILEAKS : FOREIGN MINISTER BAKOYIANNIS' VISIT TO WASHINGTON

Viewing cable 09ATHENS235, FOREIGN MINISTER BAKOYIANNIS' VISIT TO WASHINGTON


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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin

09ATHENS235 2009-02-23 05:52 2011-05-26 08:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Athens

Appears in these articles:

www.tanea.gr



VZCZCXYZ0000

PP RUEHWEB



DE RUEHTH #0235/01 0540552

ZNY CCCCC ZZH

P 230552Z FEB 09

FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3262

INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

RUEHSQ/AMEMBASSY SKOPJE PRIORITY 1206C O N F I D E N T I A L ATHENS 000235



SIPDIS



E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/19/2019

TAGS: PREL PGOV GR MK

SUBJECT: FOREIGN MINISTER BAKOYIANNIS' VISIT TO WASHINGTON



Classified By: AMBASSADOR DAN SPECKHARD. REASON: 1.4 (B) AND (D).



¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Greek FM Dora Bakoyiannis will use her

visit to Washington to define, publicly and privately,

Greece's relations with the Obama administration. A

charismatic yet practical politician, Bakoyiannis relishes

her job as Foreign Minister, and will offer to work with us

on a broad range of multilateral issues. As OSCE

Chairman-in-Office, she has moved swiftly out of the gate,

pressing creative proposals to maintain an OSCE presence in

Georgia and achieving a technical rollover of OSCE's Georgia

Military Monitors that keeps them on the ground through June.

She will offer to use her contacts with leaders in the

Middle East to assist our efforts in the region. And she

will cite Greece's ratification this week of NATO accession

protocols for Croatia and Albania as a sign of their

commitment to the Alliance and its expansion. She will also

use the opportunity to press for swift action on their most

wanted deliverable: inclusion in the Visa Waiver Program.

We also see this as an opportunity to reinvigorate and

reorient our bilateral relationship. That means urging

additional Greek contributions to NATO operations in

Afghanistan, encouraging energy diversity, and urging Greece

to resolve its disagreements with Turkey quietly and

bilaterally. Finally, we should urge the GOG to continue to

work within the UN process to resolve its dispute with the

Republic of Macedonia. END SUMMARY.



NEW ADMINISTRATION, NEW MOMENTUM



¶2. (C) PM Karamanlis' recent cabinet reshuffle left Dora

Bakoyiannis at the helm of the MFA, a job she has held for

nearly three years. The daughter of former PM Mitsotakis,

she is his strongest potential rival for the New Democracy

party's leadership (she consistently polls as Greece's most

popular politician), yet (despite near-endless press

speculation) she and Karamanlis have worked together

cooperatively. They need to. Karamanlis' government was

re-elected with two-seat Parliamentary majority in September

2007 that has since shrunk to a one-seat majority. The

government has taken additional body blows since then:

alleged involvement in various scandals, sinking economic

growth, and criticism over its handling of December's police

shooting of an Athens teenager and the extensive rioting that

followed. The rioting has been followed by a resurgence of

domestic terrorism, which Dora takes personally; her first

husband was killed by the terrorist group November 17.



¶3. (C) New Democracy has fallen 3-4 points behind its main

opposition, socialist PASOK, in opinion polls (though PM

Karamanlis personally outpolls opposition PM-in-waiting

George Papandreou by about the same margin). Looking for

electoral advantage, Bakoyiannis will spin her visit to

Washington as signaling a new era of cooperation, both on

bilateral and multilateral issues. Greeks have

overwhelmingly welcomed the Obama administration; Bakoyiannis

will be looking for "takeaways" that demonstrate our ability

to work with the Karamanlis government. However, that will

require some hard work from Greece as well.



VISA WAIVER: GREECE'S BILATERAL GOAL



¶4. (C) For Greece, inclusion in the Visa Waiver Program

tops, by far, every other issue in our bilateral

relationship. Yet their own footdragging means they have

missed the boat not once, but twice; they are the only member

of the original EU 15 not to participate. Two out of three

key pieces (the HSPD-6 Agreement and VWP MOU) are either in

place or nearly complete. The third, the agreement on

Preventing and Combating Serious Crime (PCSC) was under

review in the Ministries of Justice and Interior since

October. We finally received Greek comments on February 20.

The Secretary can assure Dora that we will examine it

rapidly, and intend to work together to meet DHS requirements

as rapidly as possible.





PROMOTING MULTILATERAL COOPERATION: IN NATO AND AFGHANISTAN

. . .



¶5. (C) Greece has contributed 638 troops to NATO operations

in Kosovo, 140 to NATO operations in Afghanistan. 50 to

NATO's counter-terrorism operation in the Mediterranean and

45 to the EU's military mission in Bosnia. Greece also

contributes directly to U.S. military operations in the

Middle East and Mediterranean through the U.S. base at Souda

Bay, Crete. But we are pressing our most NATO-skeptic ally

for more, particularly in Afghanistan -- including additional

trainers, heavy lift helicopters, and funds to sustain an

enhanced Afghan National Army. We have also asked them to

lift a self-imposed caveat restricting Greek forces to the

Kabul region, and have informal indications that may be in

the works. On February 17, the Greek Parliament ratified

Albania and Croatia's accession protocols; the Secretary will

want to congratulate Bakoyiannis on this important step.



. . . IN OSCE . . .



¶6. (C) Greece took on the chairmanship of the OSCE in

January, and has moved quickly and effectively out of the

gate. FM Bakoyiannis has already travelled to Vienna,

Albania, Kosovo, Serbia, Georgia, and Russia in her capacity

as OSCE Chairman-in-Office. Under her direction, Greek

diplomats have crafted proposals (still under review) to

maintain a long-term OSCE presence in Georgia, and have

achieved a technical rollover of the OSCE Military Monitors

in Georgia through June 30, 2009. The Secretary can commend

Bakoyiannis' commitment to the OSCE, her work so far, and

suggest we cooperate closely throughout the year. The

Secretary may also want to highlight our interest in the

OSCE's human rights work, including with Roma communities and

against human trafficking. Bakoyiannis is keenly interested

in hearing the U.S. take on Russian suggestions related to

European security.



. . . IN THE AEGEAN . . .



¶7. (C) Greece sees an uptick in "provocations" by Turkey in

the Aegean, including overflights. Bakoyiannis will

underscore the Karamanlis government's commitment to good

relations with Turkey (Karamanlis' visit to Ankara last year

is the first in fifty years), but will express concern that

the Turkish "deep state" has impeded PM Erdogan's ability to

deliver on better Turkish-Greek relations. Bakoyiannis will

likely to seek the Secretary's help with Turkey in reducing

these "provocations." We have encouraged the GOG to respond

in a low-key manner and with restraint to any perceived

"provocations" and to raise concerns directly with Turkish

counterparts.



. . . . IN THE BALKANS . . .



¶8. (C) Greece sees the Balkans as its backyard, and is a

major investor in the region. That is one reason why Greece

has put forward the candidacy of their Ambassador to the

United States, Ambassador Mallias, for EUSR (also High

Representive) in Bosnia. We have told them that we prefer

the UK candidate (Sir Emyr Jones Parry). Nevertheless, we

expect Bakoyiannis may make at least a pro forma pitch for

him. Greece has not yet recognized Kosovo but during her

February visit to Kosovo, Bakoyiannis publicly emphasized

that she had come as a "neighbor, and friend," as well as

OSCE CIO. Greece is also contributing personnel to the

International Civilian Office and its strongest NATO troop

contribution is to KFOR. Greece also continues to take a

constructive role in promoting a European orientation for

Serbia.



¶9. (C) A key issue, for both Greece and for us, is

Macedonia. Greece continues to believe that our recognition

of the Republic of Macedonia by its constitutional name in

2004 was a betrayal of our bilateral relationship. The

Karamanlis government feels it took a major step forward when

it agreed that a composite name could include the word

Macedonia -- and are aggrieved by the Gruevski government's

actions (such as a recent renaming of a planned highway built

with EU, including Greek, funds after Alexander the Great).

Greece's refusal to approve Macedonia's NATO invitation in

2008 despite the provisions of the Greek/Macedonia Interim

Accord was a major source of disagreement. UN led

negotiations continue. Bakoyiannis will likely urge us to

press the GoM for flexibility.



. . . IN THE MIDDLE EAST . . .



¶10. (C) Bakoyiannis is interested in Middle East issues,

and has developed contacts with a number of leaders in the

region. She may offer her good offices to assist in

promoting dialogue there. Greece has an Embassy in Iran, and

Bakoyiannis may also offer to facilitate dialogue there. She

has been a strong promoter of dialogue among women leaders,

and will likely invite the Secretary to participate in a

conference to be held in Athens in April on Women Against

Terrorism (held uner the auspices of the Women Leaders'

Working Group).



. . . ON CYPRUS . . .



¶11. (C) Bakoyiannis recently discussed Cyprus with Codel

Durbin, and will support efforts by the leaders of both

communities to find a settlement. She shares the Karamanlis

government's commitment to EU entry for Turkey, and knows

that a resolution of the Cyprus issue is essential for

Turkey's candidacy to move forward. Yet Greek support for

Cyprus' own position in EU fora is expected, both in Athens

and in Nicosia. In addition, Bakoyiannis will reiterate that

Turkey must meet all EU criteria, and cannot choose among

them "a la carte."



. . . ON ENERGY DIVERSITY . . .



¶12. (C) We should encourage Greece to promote energy

diversity, including within the EU. Currently, Gazprom

suplies approximately 90 percent of Greece's pipeline-sourced

natural gas supplies. Alternatives include the

Turkey-Greece-Italy (TGI) pipeline that will receive Caspian

gas, as well as increased reliance on LGN and

interconnections between European energy infrastructure.





. . . AND THE ECONOMY



¶13. (SBU) The global economic crisis is beginning to have

an impact on Greece's real economy. Growth slowed to 3.0

percent in 2008, and the government projects it will slow

even further in 2009 to 1.1 percent. While it is only one of

a handful of Eurozone countries projected to have any growth

in 2009, the slowdown is exposing some weaknesses in the

Greek economy; large current account (14.5 percent of GDP in

2008) and fiscal deficits (3.7 percent of GDP in 2008) and a

high level of public debt (94.6 percent of GDP in 2008)

constrain the GOG's flexibility to develop expenditure

programs that can mitigate the slowdwn.







SPECKHARD