WikiLeaks -- Turkish foreign policy

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P 111453Z AUG 06

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RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY 1549

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RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 0075

RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL PRIORITY 1083

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/08/2021

TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL TU

SUBJECT: TURKEY'S FOREIGN POLICY SPLIT - THE PM'S CIRCLE TO

THE FORE





Classified By: DCM Nancy McEldowney, reasons 1.4 (b), (d)



1.(C) The long-standing split between the professional MFA

diplomats and the tight circle of advisers around PM Erdogan

has widened noticeably in recent weeks. This gap has existed

under Erdogan,s Justice and Development Party (AKP)

government, largely because of the close links that both PM

Erdogan and FM Gul have with PM adviser Davutoglu, who has

been willing to undertake numerous initiatives. Until

recently, however, such strains have usually been more

effectively papered over. This internal debate now affects

every step the GOT takes on the international stage.



2.(C) The Turkish diplomatic corps is highly educated and

well attuned to what will sell in the U.S. or Europe; less so

on the domestic political front. PM Erdogan,s core of AKP

advisers, including Davutoglu and the AKP vice chairs,

understand what will play well with their constituencies.

Their sense of how policy will play outside of Ankara is

handicapped, however, by their Turkey- and Islam-centric

vision of how they want the world to operate.



¶3. (C/NF) Decoupling MFA from the PM,s advisers can produce

a greater willingness to take chances. At the same time, it

can also create greater room for misunderstandings or

wrongfooted efforts. In the run-up to the February 2006

Hamas visit to Ankara, for example, MFA was kept in the dark.

The AKPers who dealt with the visit did so in a haphazard

and uncoordinated manner. MFA, uninformed, was unable to

preview it with us. The backlash from the U.S. in particular

truly took AKP aback. It took weeks -) even months -)

before limited understanding dawned on the depth of the

displeasure the Hamas venture had spawned, and why. It did

not (and still does not) fit within their frame of reference.





¶4. (C/NF) Most startling, perhaps, to AKP were those in the

U.S. and elsewhere who, in the aftermath of the Hamas visit,

asked how AKP would feel if we met with PKK leaders. For

Erdogan,s circle, it is not analogous: for them, terrorism

equals the PKK. It is difficult for PM Erdogan to believe

that his philanthropist Islamic friend Al Kadi could be

involved in terrorist financing, just as it is alien to their

frame of reference to view specific Islamic groups as

terrorists. Hamas and Hizballah are the result of western

policies gone awry, a response from desperate people )- not

truly terrorists. Allow them to talk reason to these people,

exert Turkish influence, and the Hamases of the world will

change. This has been evident in other Turkish efforts

throughout the region as well -- with Iran (FM Mottaki,s

visit here; Erdogan,s talks with Ahmedinejad on the margins

of international conferences); with Syria (the Turks believe

they were instrumental in getting Syria,s Asad to agree to

pull troops out of Lebanon, and to certain aspects of the

Hariri investigation); with the current conflict in Lebanon

and the Gaza strip.



5.(C/NF) A more recent example of the PM circle-MFA

disconnect involved Davutoglu,s trip to Damascus the first

week of July, where he met not only with Asad but Misha,al

as well. The MFA was cut out and furious (their Ambassador

to Damascus reportedly cooled his heels outside while

Davutoglu met with Asad).



6.(C) As the Israel-Lebanon crisis intensified, so has this

tendency within Erdogan,s small circle. AKP sees own its

back to the public opinion wall. Instead of exercising

leadership, Erdogan -- in populist pre-election mode -- has

followed. He is playing to AKP,s constituency; to those

within the party who have never been positively inclined

toward Israel; and to the greater regional Sunni audience

that he is trying to court. Two early results, aimed at

these audiences, were (1) the PM,s participation in the

August 3 extraordinary OIC executive council meetin in Kuala

Lumpur, where he again met with Irnian president Ahmedinejad

and uttered strong anti-Israeli statements; and (2) FM Gul,s

August 3 op-ed piece in the Washington Post, which aired GOT

ire in an unhelpful way and blindsided the professional

Turkish diplomats in Washington.



7.(C/NF) Complicit or not (we believe the former), Gul has

had his name sullied by a number of these efforts. He will

have to decide whether to give the MFA renewed weight -)



Foreign Ministry officials could be key in bridging certain

delicate issues, particularly Cyprus, with both the

government and the military, for example -) or go with the

PM,s circle.



Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at

http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/



WILSON