Τρίτη 30 Νοεμβρίου 2010

Wikileaks -- PANAMA COUP 1990...

P 131914Z DEC 89


FM AMEMBASSY PANAMA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7213

INFO SECDEF WASHDC

DIA WASHDC

USIA WASHDC 8090

USCINCSO QUARRY HTS PM

PANCANAL COMM

USLO CARIBBEAN

AMEMBASSY BOGOTA

AMEMBASSY CARACAS

AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE

AMEMBASSY MANAGUA

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY ROME

AMEMBASSY MADRID

AMEMBASSY BONNS E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 PANAMA 08545



E.O.12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: PGOV PREL PM US

SUBJECT: PANAMANIANS HOPE FOR A SUCCESSFUL COUP

-- NORIEGA PLANS FOR A NEW YEAR IN POWER



¶1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.



--------------------------------

SUMMARY

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¶2. THROUGHOUT 1989, RAPIDLY UNFOLDING POLITICAL

DEVELOPMENTS HELD OUT HOPE TO MANY PANAMANIANS FOR

A RESOLUTION TO PANAMA’S POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC

CRISIS: THE ELECTION OF MAY 7, THE SUBSEQUENT OAS

NEGOTIATIONS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL DEADLINE OF

SEPTEMBER 1, THE COUP ATTEMPT OF OCTOBER 3, AND

THE TREATY DEADLINE OF JANUARY 1, 1990.

PROJECTING INTO THE FIRST HALF OF 1990, NO SUCH

HOPEFUL EVENTS AND DATES ARE READILY APPARENT.

THE OPPOSITION’S MAIN OBJECTIVE WILL BE TO SURVIVE

POLITICALLY, ECONOMICALLY, AND LITERALLY UNTIL THE

NEXT COUP. NORIEGA WILL HAVE TO TRY AND

CONSOLIDATE HIS CONTROL OVER THE PANAMA DEFENSE

FORCES (FDP) AND AVOID ANOTHER UPRISING.



¶3. PRESSURES ON NORIEGA HAVE INCREASED ACROSS THE

BOARD, BUT HE SEEMS TO HAVE DETERMINED THAT HE CAN

MANAGE THEM. DESPITE NEW U.S. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS,

THE MOST PRECIPITOUS ECONOMIC DROP IS OVER FOR

NOW, FOLLOWING A TWO-YEAR, 25 PERCENT DROP IN

GDP. INTERNATIONAL ISOLATION REMAINS AN IRRITANT

TO THE REGIME, BUT IT IS NOT A SERIOUS PROBLEM FOR

NORIEGA’S STABILITY. U.S. ACTIONS, FROM THE

APPOINTMENT OF AN ACTING CANAL ADMINISTRATOR TO

RUMORED COVERT PLANS AGAINST NORIEGA AS WELL AS

NEW ECONOMIC SANCTIONS, ALLOW NORIEGA TO BEAT THE

NATIONALISTIC DRUM AND MAKE IT APPEAR AS IF

DOMESTIC SUPPORT FOR HIM IS GROWING.



¶4. NORIEGA’S WEAKEST POINT REMAINS HIS OWN

INSTITUTION. WHISPERS THAT “THE OCTOBER 3 COUP IS

NOT OVER” CONTINUE AND NORIEGA CONTINUES TO HOLD

ON MAINLY BY BRUTAL REPRESSION OF ANY POTENTIAL

NEW INSIDE OPPONENTS. WHEN ANOTHER ACTION TO

REMOVE NORIEGA WILL TAKE PLACE IS UNCERTAIN, BUT

WAITING FOR THAT POSSIBILITY IS THE MAIN PROSPECT

FOR PANAMA IN 1990. END SUMMARY.



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THE CRISIS GRINDS ON

---------------------------------------

¶5. THE PANAMA CRISIS CONTINUES TO GRIND ON WITH

NO CLEAR END IN SIGHT. NORIEGA TENACIOUSLY HOLDS

ON TO POWER, INTIMIDATING HIS OPPONENTS AND FIRING

UP HIS SUPPORTERS WITH SLOGANS CALLING FOR

RETRIBUTION AGAINST “PANAMANIAN TRAITORS AND THEIR

U.S. MASTERS,” SHOULD ANYTHING HAPPEN TO HIM.

NORIEGA IS WEAKER THAN HE WAS AT THIS TIME LAST

YEAR, BUT THE IMPACT OF THE CURRENT SET OF

PRESSURES HAVE SO FAR FAILED TO EJECT HIM FROM

OFFICE.



¶6. NEVERTHELESS, RECENT PRESS REPORTS OF AN

ALLEGED U.S. COVERT ACTION PLAN AGAINST NORIEGA

HAVE ONCE AGAIN RAISED HOPES OF SOME PANAMANIANS

THAT THIS MAY BE THE BEGINNING OF HIS END.

NORIEGA HIMSELF IS APPARENTLY ATTACHING SOME

CREDIBILITY TO THE PRESS REPORTS. HE HAS REACTED

NERVOUSLY BY STEPPING UP HARASSMENT OF THE

OPPOSITION AND INCREASING THE SIZE, TRAINING,

ACTIVITY, AND ARMAMENT OF HIS “DIGNITY

BATTALIONS.” THE OPPOSITION LEADERSHIP IS

CONCERNED OVER THE NEW “EYE FOR AN EYE”

PARA-MILITARY CAMPAIGN, WHICH NORIEGA HAS USED TO

REMIND THE OPPOSITION OF ITS VULNERABILITY.



---------------------------------------

REGIME POLITICAL ACTIVITY

---------------------------------------

¶7. THE RODRIGUEZ ADMINISTRATION, UNSURPRISINGLY,

REMAINS INEFFECTUAL, BUT CONTINUES TO LIMP ALONG.

REGIME SOURCES INDICATE WITH SOME DEGREE OF

CERTITUDE THAT NORIEGA IS UNHAPPY WITH HIS

CIVILIAN PUPPETS, THAT HE MAY EVEN FIRE RODRIGUEZ,

AND PLANS TO TAKE OVER THE FORMAL REIGNS OF

GOVERNMENT SOON. THE ASSEMBLY OF 510 LOCAL

DISTRICT REPRESENTATIVES (ANRC) CONFIRMED HIM AS

”NATIONAL COORDINATOR” ON NOVEMBER 22. THIS

BRINGS HIM ONE STEP CLOSER TO BEING NAMED “HEAD OF

GOVERNMENT”, WHICH HE AND OTHERS AROUND HIM HAVE

HINTED AT FOR SOME TIME.



¶8. MANY VIEW THIS NORIEGA MOVE AS THE FINAL STEP

TOWARD A TOTALITARIAN REGIME AND FURTHER SEVERE

REPRESSION. SOME SEE THIS AS A PENDING NORIEGA

MISTAKE. AS “HEAD OF GOVERNMENT”, HE WOULD HAVE

TO BEAR FULL OFFICIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR REGIME

ACTIONS. AT THE SAME TIME, BY INTRODUCING A NEW

ELEMENT -- HIS GOVERNMENTAL ROLE -- INTO THE STALE

POLITICAL SITUATION, NORIEGA MAY BE ABLE TO USE

HIS USUAL MIXTURE OF OBFUSCATION AND INTIMIDATION

TO BUY HIMSELF MORE TIME AND POLITICAL BREATHING

SPACE.



------------------------------------------

THE OPPOSITION

------------------------------------------

¶9. NORIEGA’S MOST RECENT PARA-MILITARY SHOW OF

FORCE FURTHER CONVINCED THE OPPOSITION THAT

POLITICAL ACTION WILL RESULT ONLY IN GREATER

REGIME BRUTALITY AGAINST THEM, NOT NORIEGA’S

DEPARTURE. THE OPPOSITION LEADERSHIP QUIETLY

HOPES THAT CLANDESTINE (AND OTHER) U.S. ACTION,

POSSIBLY COUPLED WITH ANOTHER COUP WILL REMOVE

NORIEGA. THE LEADERS SEE THEMSELVES PLAYING A

ROLE IN THE NEXT COUP ATTEMPT AND THEIR CURRENT

PREPARATIONS ARE FOCUSED ON BEING ABLE TO MOVE IN

TO FILL THE GOVERNMENT VACUUM IF THE NEXT EFFORT

SHOULD SUCCEED. THE CIVILIAN OPPOSITION

RECOGNIZES THE POLITICAL REALITY THAT THE MILITARY

IS THE MAIN POLITICAL FORCE IN PANAMA.



¶10. AS THE MEMORY -- AND TO SOME EXTENT THE

LEGITIMACY -- OF THE MAY ELECTION RECEDES, THE

PRESSURE ON THE LEADERSHIP FROM WITHIN THE

OPPOSITION RANKS “TO DO SOMETHING” TO MAINTAIN

POLITICAL LEGITIMACY IS GROWING, HOWEVER.

OPPOSITION ABILITY TO CULTIVATE POLITICAL SUPPORT

AND TRUST IN THE ADOC LEADERSHIP ARE HAMPERED BY

EFFECTIVE NORIEGA INTIMIDATION AT THE GRASS ROOTS

LEVEL. MEANWHILE, U.S. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ARE

CONTINUING TO HURT AND NEW MEASURES ARE

UNPOPULAR. THE OPPOSITION LEADERSHIP FEARS THAT

MANY PANAMANIANS -- INCLUDING THEIR FOLLOWERS --

WILL INCREASINGLY DEMAND THAT THE AMERICANS GET

OFF THEIR BACKS, IF NORIEGA WON’T.



¶11. PANAMA’S OPPOSITION AND PANAMANIANS IN

GENERAL RAN UP MANY SHORT TERM HILLS IN 1989 -

WITH THE END ALWAYS JUST OVER THE HORIZON. MAY

ELECTIONS, THE OAS NEGOTIATIONS, SEPTEMBER 1,

OCTOBER 3, AND NOW JANUARY 1, 1990 HAVE ALL TOO

EASILY BEEN ACCEPTED AS TARGETS FOR WHEN THE

PANAMA CRISIS WOULD “HAVE TO” BE SOLVED. ALREADY

ADOC LEADER GUILLERMO “BILLY” FORD IS TALKING OF

FEBRUARY 25 (NICARAGUAN ELECTION DAY) AS A DATE

BEFORE WHICH NORIEGA MUST FALL IF THE U.S. DOES

NOT WISH TO HAVE THE PRECEDENT OF AN ANNULLED

ELECTION REPEATED IN NICARAGUA . OVERALL,

HOWEVER, THE OPPOSITION HAS LITTLE ENERGY LEFT TO

CHARGE UP ANOTHER HILL UNLESS CONVINCED IT IS THE

LAST ONE. ONLY ANOTHER COUP HOLDS OUT SUCH A

PROMISE, BUT THE OPPOSITION IS NOT ABLE TO

INFLUENCE THAT TO ANY SIGNIFICANT DEGREE.



---------------------------------------

THE NEXT COUP ATTEMPT

---------------------------------------

¶12. THE MOST (AND MAYBE ONLY) HOPEFUL SIGN FOR

NORIEGA’S OPPONENTS IN 1990 IS THAT TROUBLES

INSIDE THE FDP ARE WORSE THAN THEY HAVE EVER

BEEN. REASSIGNMENTS AND PROMOTIONS FLOWING FROM

THE POST-COUP PURGE ARE JUST NOW BEING MADE --

MORE THAN TWO MONTHS AFTER THE EVENT. MANY OF THE

MORE “PROFESSIONAL” FDP OFFICERS AND NCO’S WERE

KILLED, TORTURED, OR DISMISSED AFTER OCTOBER 3.

THE SUCCESSOR CROP OF TRUE BELIEVERS HAS NEITHER

THE EXPERIENCE, TRAINING OR INTELLIGENCE TO FILL

THE SHOES OF THEIR PREDECESSORS. NORIEGA HAS HAD

TO RELY MAINLY ON HIMSELF OR THE SUPPORT OF THIS

SMALL CLIQUE OF LOYALISTS SINCE THE COUP ATTEMPT.

HIS INCREASED USE OF DIGNITY BATTALIONS IS ALSO

WEARING ON THE CAREER SOLDIERS. WHAT LITTLE

MILITARY PRIDE THEY HAVE LEFT HAS BEEN INJURED BY

THE ACTIVITIES OF THIS PARA-MILITARY RABBLE WHICH

THEY FEAR WILL GET OUT OF CONTROL AND ULTIMATELY

HURT THE INSTITUTION. WITH THE DIGNITY BATTALIONS

AND OTHER IRREGULARS OVER 2000 IN NUMBER THE IMAGE

OF A COMPETING PARA-MILITARY FORCE IS BEGINNING TO

ARISE.



¶13. DISCONTENT AND FEELINGS OF REVENGE CONTINUE

TO FESTER INSIDE THE FDP AND THERE ARE NUMEROUS

REPORTS THAT THERE ARE “INDIVIDUALS” WHO ARE

PREPARED TO ACT ON THESE EMOTIONS. ONE REGIME

INSIDER RECENTLY CLAIMED THAT NORIEGA’S NOMINAL

NUMBER 2, COLONEL MARCO JUSTINES, IS HIMSELF

LOOKING FOR WAYS TO INCH OUT HIS BOSS. MEANWHILE,

NOTORIOUS CIVILIAN SUPPORTERS OF NORIEGA, SUCH AS

XXXXXXXXXXXXXX(STRICTLY PROTECT),

ARE ALREADY LOOKING BEYOND NORIEGA’S DEPARTURE IN

ADVOCATING WITH EMBOFFS AN OPPOSITION DECLARATION

OF AMNESTY FOR REGIME SUPPORTERS. SOURCES NOW

INDICATE THAT NORIEGA SUSPECTS ANOTHER ATTEMPT TO

UNSEAT HIM AS EARLY AS DECEMBER 15.



------------------------------------------

THE STATUS OF “UNRELENTING PRESSURES”

------------------------------------------



INTERNATIONAL

-------------

¶14. THE RECENT RESOLUTION OF THE OASGA CONFIRMED

NORIEGA’S ISOLATION IN THE HEMISPHERE, BUT WAS MET

WITH ONLY FLEETING INTEREST IN PANAMA. THE FDP’S

DISINVITATION TO THE RECENT CONFERENCE OF THE

AMERICAN ARMIES IN GUATEMALA WAS POTENTIALLY A

MORE SERIOUS BLOW TO FDP MORALE, BUT THIS COLD

SHOULDER FROM THEIR LATIN COLLEAGUES PASSED

LARGELY UNNOTICED BECAUSE OF NORIEGA’S ABSOLUTE

CONTROL OF INFORMATION INSIDE AND OUTSIDE HIS

INSTITUTION.



¶15. AMBASSADORS OF MOST NATIONS REMAIN OUTSIDE

PANAMA, EITHER ON VACATION OR CONSULTATIONS, BUT

LOCAL DIPLOMATIC ISOLATION MAY BE IN DANGER. THE

FRENCH AMBASSADOR RECENTLY RETURNED FROM HIS

”VACATION” TO REJOIN HIS ITALIAN AND SPANISH

COLLEAGUES WHO NEVER LEFT. SEVERAL AMBASSADORS

AND MILITARY ATTACHES (E.G. MEXICO) MAY VISIT

THEIR FAMILIES WHICH ARE RESIDING HERE AT

CHRISTMAS. NORIEGA IS MAKING ALL HE CAN OUT OF

CONTACTS WITH THE USSR, THE PRC, LIBYA, CUBA,

NICARAGUA, AND EVEN U.S. ANTI-ESTABLISHMENT

GROUPS. HE WILL ALSO SEEK TO CONJURE UP SOME

LIMITED LEGITIMACY IN HIS PLEA FOR LATIN

SOLIDARITY OVER THE CANAL ADMINISTRATOR ISSUE.



ECONOMIC

--------

¶16. THE REGIME CONTINUES TO HAVE CASH FLOW

PROBLEMS, BUT THE ECONOMIC DOWNWARD SPIRAL HAS

LEVELED OFF FOR NOW. NORIEGA IS ABLE TO COMBAT

THE WORST DISRUPTIONS BY SALARY ADJUSTMENTS AND

CONTINUED GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT OF LOYALISTS.

UNEMPLOYMENT OVERALL IS ON THE RISE, BUT ONE OF

THE “PILLARS” OF THE PANAMANIAN SERVICE ECONOMY --

THE COLON FREE ZONE -- IS HAVING RECORD SALES AND

PROVIDES SOMEWHAT INCREASING EMPLOYMENT IN THE

POLITICALLY VOLATILE COLON AREA.



¶17. MEANWHILE, PARA-MILITARY DIGNITY BATTALIONS

ARE ENLISTING OR SCARING THE UNEMPLOYED.

BUSINESSMEN, HURT BY NORIEGA AND U.S. SANCTIONS,

ARE INCREASINGLY MORE LIKELY TO MOVE TOWARD

ACCOMMODATION WITH NORIEGA. MANY FEEL THEY HAVE

TO GIVE PRIORITY TO BEING ABLE TO STAY IN BUSINESS.



U.S. PRESSURES

--------------

¶18. FURTHER U.S. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS HEIGHTEN THE

SENSE OF CRISIS IN PANAMA, CREATING THE PARADOX OF

REGIME-OPPOSITION-CHURCH AGREEMENT IN OPPOSING

THEM. THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE U.S. PORT BAN FOR

PANAMANIAN FLAGGED VESSELS AND THE APPOINTMENT OF

A TEMPORARY CANAL ADMINISTRATOR CREATE NEW

PROBLEMS AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR NORIEGA. BANNING

PANAMANIAN FLAGGED VESSELS FROM THE U.S. WILL ROB

NORIEGA AND HIS CRONIES OF A CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT

OF INCOME. SOME OF THE LATTER MAY EVEN JUMP SHIP

AND TURN ON HIM. BUT IN THE END RESULT, MANY MORE

MAY REALIZE THAT IT WAS THEY WHO DEPENDED ON HIM,

NOT HE ON THEM.



¶19. THE CANAL ADMINISTRATOR APPOINTMENT OFFERS

NORIEGA SOME ADDITIONAL NATIONALISTIC PEGS TO

SUPPORT HIS SEARCH FOR DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL

SUPPORT. BLOWING THE TREATY VIOLATION AND

NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY WHISTLE MAY WELL GAIN HIM

SOME SUPPORT. PLAYED WELL, HE MAY AGAIN BE ABLE

TO DO WHAT HE DOES BEST: BUY TIME.



---------------------------------------------

THE FUTURE OF THE PANAMA CRISIS

---------------------------------------------

¶20. DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN OPPOSITION TO NORIEGA IS

SHOWING SIGNS OF FATIGUE. FOREIGN ATTENTION IN

PARTICULAR IS DISTRACTED BY MUCH HIGHER PROFILE

REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL EVENTS, FROM EL

SALVADOR TO BERLIN. OF COURSE, NORIEGA TOO IS

TIRING, EXEMPLIFIED IN HIS SLOWNESS IN SETTLING

THE TURMOIL INSIDE HIS OWN INSTITUTION. BUT HE IS

A MASTER OF SURVIVAL AND ABLE TO BUILD ON THE

FATIGUE OF OTHERS. RENEWED NOISES IN RECENT

REGIME PRONOUNCEMENTS OF A WILLINGNESS TO “TALK”

ARE A CLASSIC MANIFESTATION OF TRIED AND TRUE

NORIEGA TIME-BUYING TACTICS.



¶21. THE POLITICAL TENSION IN PANAMA, INCREASED BY

RECENT PRESS REVELATIONS AND U.S. SANCTIONS

ANNOUNCEMENTS, WILL LIKELY EBB IN EARLY 1990,

ABSENT SOME MAJOR EVENT. NORIEGA IS SHOWING NO

SIGNS THAT HE HAS ANY INTENTION OF LEAVING

VOLUNTARILY. GIVEN BROAD POLITICAL REALITIES IN

THIS COUNTRY, THE ONLY HOPE FOR A FIRST STEP IN

CRISIS RESOLUTION IS ANOTHER COUP. WAITING FOR

THAT TO HAPPEN IS THE MAIN POLITICAL PROSPECT FOR

PANAMA IN 1990.





BUSHNELL

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